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Learning From Experience? An Empirical Evaluation of the 2000-2004 Municipal 
Mergers in New South Wales 
 




While the bulk of the empirical evidence shows that municipal mergers do not improve the 
performance of local authorities, Australian policymakers nonetheless continue to impose 
council amalgamation, as illustrated by the current New South Wales Fit for the Future local 
government reform process. This paper first critically examines the empirical evidence 
employed by the Independent Local Government Review Panel on the impact of the 2004 
council mergers. We argue that this evidence is flawed. We then provide an empirical 
assessment of the municipal mergers, which occurred over 2000-2004 with our sample drawn 
from Group 4 councils in the New South Wales variant of the Australian Local Government 
Classification System.  Group 4 councils represent a group of significant regional cities and 
town councils with similar operational activities.  We demonstrate that merged councils have 
not performed any better than their unmerged peers over the period 2004 to 2014. The paper 
concludes with some brief policy implications for local government reform in New South 
Wales and elsewhere. 
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Although the efficacy of municipal mergers as an instrument of local government reform 
remains mired in controversy, with little support in the empirical literature (see, for instance, 
Lago-Penas & Martinez-Vazquez, 2013; Journal of Public Finance and Management, Special 
Editions, 13(2) and 13(3), 2013; Faulk & Hicks, 2011), Australian local government 
policymakers continue to use forced amalgamation as a major engine of reform. Indeed, over 
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the past two decades, compulsory council consolidation programs have been conducted in 
every Australian state and territory, with the sole exception of Western Australia where the 
Barnett Government recently (and unsuccessfully) attempted to force mergers on reluctant 
Perth councils (Dollery, et al., 2013). The amalgamation drive by the New South Wales 
Government under its Fit for the Future process thus follows a well-trodden path.  
 
The NSW Government’s Fit for the Future reform process had its genesis in the 
‘Destination 2036 Workshop’ held in Dubbo on 19th August 2011. Introduced by (then) 
Minister for Local Government, Don Page, Destination 2036 witnessed the appointment of 
the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) as well as the Local Government 
Acts Taskforce. ILGRP (2013a: 48) recommended sweeping compulsory council 
consolidation across NSW, concentrating largely in the Greater Sydney metropolitan region. 
With respect to Greater Sydney, ILGRP (2013a: 5) observed that it sought to ‘reduce the 
number of councils in the Sydney basin to around 15, and create major new cities of Sydney, 
Parramatta and Liverpool, each with populations of 600-800,000’. Despite repeated 
assurances that it would adhere strictly to ‘evidence-based’ policy prescription, the interim 
ILGRP Report (2013a) nevertheless offered no empirical evidence in support of the proposed 
mergers.  
 
The forced merger program advocated by ILGRP (2013a) was greeted with dismay by 
NSW local government. It was attacked on numerous counts, not only because of the absence 
of any empirical basis for its merger recommendations, but also the quality of its 
commissioned research, particularly Jeff Tate Consulting (2013). As we shall see, instead of 
assessing the success of the 2004 forced amalgamations in NSW by comparing the 
subsequent performance of merged and unmerged councils against OLG (2013) data, or the 
TCorp (2013) financial ratios, half of which were later adopted as Fit for the Future criteria, 
Jeff Tate Consulting (2013) simply conferred (in qualitative terms only) with some 
representatives of five of the amalgamated councils. 
 
After public consultation with local government and other interested parties across NSW, 
in October 2013 the ILGRP submitted its final report ILGRP (2013b) to the NSW 
Government. The chief difference between the interim ILGRP Report (2013a) and the final 
ILGRP Report (2013b) lay in a shift away from outright compulsory council consolidation to 
the establishment of a ‘strengthened’ Boundaries Commission to deliberate on proposals for 
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council amalgamation and make binding recommendations concerning mergers, with or 
without the consent of affected councils (ILGRP, 2013b). 
 
However, in common with interim ILGRP Report (2013a), the final ILGRP Report 
(2013b), continued to insist that municipal mergers were vital to improving NSW local 
government. In its overall assessment of local government financial sustainability in NSW, 
ILGRP (2013a: 6) had argued that ‘it is also clear that the financial base of the sector is in 
urgent need of repair’, adding that ‘put simply, there are too many councils chasing too few 
resources’. This theme was reiterated in final ILGRP Report (2013b: 72) which noted that 
‘NSW simply cannot sustain 152 councils’. In common with the interim ILGRP report 
(2013a), the final ILGRP report (2013b), offered no empirical evidence in support of its 
proposed council mergers. This further alienated the NSW local government community, 
especially those councils targeted for consolidation. 
 
The NSW Cabinet publicly released the final ILGRP Report (2013b) in January 2014. In 
April 2014, after the resignation of Premier O’Farrell, incoming Premier Baird reshuffled the 
NSW Cabinet, replacing inter alia Minister for Local Government Don Page with Paul Toole. 
These events may account for the fact that the NSW Government only formally responded to 
the recommendations in final ILGRP Report (2013b) in September 2014 in the form of a Fit 
for the Future policy package (OLG, 2014).  
 
Fit for the Future adopted the final recommendations of the ILGRP for all its proposed 
council mergers, without adding any supporting empirical evidence. This was despite the fact 
that the ILGRP Chair had stated that it was never intended for the ILGRP’s ‘preferred 
options’ to be considered as binding recommendations (Sansom, 2015). Fit for the Future 
advanced a process for council ‘self-assessment’ against performance indicators, each with 
stipulated criteria, in which individual local authorities must submit ‘merge’, ‘stand-alone’, or 
‘rural council’ proposals to the NSW Office of Local Government (OLG) by 30 June 2015. 
These proposals were assessed by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) 
which then forwarded its recommendations to the Minister in late October 2015. 
 
In this paper we address the failure of the ILGRP and the architects of the Fit for the 
Future to assess the outcomes of the 2000-2004 council mergers in terms of their subsequent 
performance. In order to rectify this omission, we empirically assess the performance of 
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municipalities merged in NSW over the period 2000-2004 in an effort to determine 
quantitatively, using official data, the relative impact of amalgamation on council 
performance. Our analysis demonstrates that, despite the significant costs involved in these 
municipal mergers, together with substantial disruption and community division, 
amalgamated councils performed no better than their unmerged peers. Had our evidence been 
available to the ILGRP or the OLG, it would have surely at the very least have induced 
caution on the controversial question of amalgamation. 
 
The paper is divided into six main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic review of the 
empirical literature on the impact of municipal mergers on municipal performance. Section 3 
considers the current NSW amalgamation process in terms of an archetypal ‘model’ of 
Australian merger programs. Section 4 provides a critical account of the analysis of the 2004 
NSW local government merger program conducted by Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd (2013) for 
the ILGRP, which focused on an unrepresentative sample of only five amalgamated entities 
and involved no quantitative assessment of post-merger performance. Section 5 sets out the 
characteristics of NSW Group 4 councils and the rationale for sample selection. Section 6 
considers our empirical analysis of the 2000-2004 NSW council mergers over the period 2004 
to 2014. The paper ends in section 7 by drawing some brief policy lessons for the current Fit 
for the Future process in NSW from this earlier amalgamation episode. 
 
 
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF MUNICIPAL MERGERS 
 
The bulk of empirical work on the impact of mergers has focused on American local 
government; Leland and Thurmaier (2006; 2010), Faulk and Hicks (2011) and Faulk and 
Grassmueck (2012) provide recent reviews of this work. In general, American researchers 
have established that council consolidation has not met expectations of efficiency gains, cost 
savings and other purported benefits. Thus Feiock (2004) demonstrated that mergers led to 
increased expenditures, Martin and Schiff (2011) found little evidence of enhanced 
performance, and Leland and Thurmaier (2010) examined nine case studies of merged and 
comparable unmerged local authorities, concluding that efficiency gains are not a predictable 
consequence of amalgamation. 
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These general conclusions have been echoed in empirical work on municipal mergers 
elsewhere. For instance, in the Canadian milieu, Reese (2004) established that remuneration 
levels increased post-merger, with a net rise in overall council expenditure and Vojnovic 
(2000) found that aggregate costs increased in three of the five local council mergers 
examined. Similarly, contributors to Dollery and Robotti (2008) considered council mergers 
in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, all concluding that amalgamation had not achieved its 
intended effects. Moreover, in a Special Edition of Local Government Studies on European 
amalgamation, contributors drew similar conclusions on mergers in Eastern Europe, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Macedonia, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 
An embryonic Australian empirical literature has investigated the impact of municipal 
mergers on council performance (see Dollery et al., (2012) for a detailed review). With some 
exceptions, such as Soul’s (2000) empirical analysis of council size and per capita service 
costs in NSW, the Australian literature is uniformly pessimistic of municipal mergers as a 
means of improving local government performance. In contrast to the previous concentration 
on the descriptive analysis of case studies, a new strand of the Australian literature has 
employed the econometric analysis of state-wide datasets  to determine the effect of mergers 
on council performance (see, for example, Drew and Dollery (2013; 2014a; 2014b); Drew et 
al., (2012; 2013; 2014; 2015); Marques et al., (2014). The present paper seeks to contribute to 
this literature by empirically investigating the outcomes of the 2000-2004 NSW council 
amalgamation program by comparing merged and unmerged peer councils. 
 
3. MUNICIPAL MERGERS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Australian forced amalgamation programs follow a common pattern (Dollery et al., 2012). 
In the first instance, a newly-elected state government typically grumbles publically of 
general municipal inefficiency and a concomitant lack of fiscal viability and then launches an 
‘independent’ inquiry to examine methods of improving local government. After a period of 
deliberation, the inquiry usually publishes a discussion paper(s), followed by an interim report 
and then a final report, which almost invariably recommend forced mergers. After a 




Once forced amalgamation has taken place, a common pattern is also evident (Dollery et 
al., 2012). Ongoing public discontent with council mergers characteristically continues, often 
for years, which occasionally results in de-amalgamation, as in Queensland see, for example, 
De Souza et al. (2014). Furthermore, no public reporting of the costs of mergers to affected 
councils or their local communities occurs, state governments never undertake assessments of 
merger outcomes, and no improvement in the operational efficiency or financial viability of 
merged local authorities is observed. After a period of years, the cycle begins again. 
 
The current NSW local government process closely approximates this pattern. As we have 
seen, the NSW Government initiated an inquiry into NSW local government led by the 
ILGRP immediately after its Destination 2036 Workshop in August 2011. Since the 
Destination 2036 Workshop, ministers and the media had made pointed negative comments 
about the parlous state of NSW local government and the need to improve its prospects (Daily 
Telegraph, 2015; Hansard, 2015; Sydney Morning Herald, 2015a, 2015b;  LG Focus, 2011).   
 
After its establishment, the ILGRP published a discussion paper LGRP (2012). This was 
followed by an interim report ILGRP (2013a), which recommended far-reaching council 
mergers. In its final report ILGRP (2013b) dated October 2013, but only made public early in 
2014, the ILGRP continued to insist amalgamation represented a key to improving NSW local 
government. 
 
As we have seen, ILGRP (2013b) softened the hardline stance on forced mergers in the 
interim ILGRP Report (2013a) by recommending a strengthened Boundaries Commission 
consider its proposed council amalgamations on a ‘case-by-case’ basis and make binding 
recommendations. The NSW Government’s Fit for the Future program subsequently adopted 
the ILGRP’s merger recommendations with alacrity and the process is now underway.  
 
A significant problem with both the recommendations of the ILGRP and the subsequent 
embrace of its merger proposals in Fit for the Future resides in the absence of supporting 
empirical evidence for council amalgamation in NSW. Indeed, as we noted earlier, the weight 
of the empirical literature onlocal government runs strongly against the efficacy of municipal 
mergers as an instrument of local government reform.  
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The ILGRP certainly paid ‘lip service’ to the need to take into account empirical 
evidence. For instance, in its final report ILGRP (2013b: 12) assured readers that it had been 
an ‘evidence-based inquiry’, which had ‘referenced a large number of research papers and 
reports of previous inquiries’, commissioned ‘supplementary research in several key areas’, 
together with ‘new surveys and opinion polling’, taken submissions from ‘councils and 
others’ and considered ‘reviews and studies of various aspects of local government under way 
in other states, particularly Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria’.  
 
At a more detailed level, ILGRP (2013b: 12) went on to specify those reports which it had 
held to be ‘of particular importance’. These were: 
 
…[Reports] on the Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local 
Government Sector released by the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) in 
April 2013; and the Local Government Infrastructure Audit completed by 
the Division of Local Government (DLG) in May. Reports of several other 
recent inquiries were also most valuable, notably the ‘Allan’ inquiry 
commissioned by the Local Government and Shires Associations (2006); 
and studies of the local government revenue base by the Productivity 
Commission (2008) and IPART (2009). 
 
However, ILGRP (2013b) does not make clear the fact that none of the reports prescribed 
amalgamation and only the Independent Local Government Inquiry (LGI) Allan (2006) 
actually considered municipal mergers. Moreover, the Allan Inquiry concluded that shared 
services represented a far superior method of securing the benefits attendant on scale 
compared with forced amalgamation.  
 
Despite repeated assurances by the ILGRP that it would adhere to ‘evidence-based’ 
policymaking, such as its claim in its interim report ILGRP (2013b: 7) that its approach to 
municipal mergers had been ‘evidence-based and pragmatic, not ideological’, the ILGRP 
barely bothered to assess the outcomes of the 2004 NSW forced amalgamation program 
conducted by the (then) Carr Government, despite opposition by the local government sector. 
In fact, with respect to the outcomes of the 2004 amalgamation program, all the ILGRP 
actually did was engage the South Australian commercial consultants Jeff Tate Consulting Pty 
Ltd to conduct an assessment of five merged councils, without even calling for a comparative 
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study of merged and unmerged councils using published official data. As we have observed, it 
is thus not at all surprising that the ILGRP  proceeded to recommend council mergers with 
little knowledge of the effects of amalgamation on councils merged in 2004. 
 
4. JEFF TATE CONSULTING PTY LTD ANALYSIS OF 2004 MERGERS 
 
The ILGRP engaged Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd to evaluate the 2004 NSW council 
mergers. The ILGRP provided Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd (2013: 1) with the following 
terms of engagement: 
• ‘Review relevant research into the processes and outcomes of Council 
amalgamations in NSW and other states over the last 20 years;  
• identify relevant findings from the research to inform an assessment of 
the processes and outcomes of a sample of recent (2004) 
amalgamations in NSW; 
• assess the processes and outcomes of a sample of five Council 
amalgamations that occurred in 2004, considering the following 
matters:  
• whether each amalgamation has produced positive outcomes;  
• the circumstances, process and/or scale of change required for 
amalgamations to produce positive outcomes;  
• how significant and lasting the costs and disruption associated with 
amalgamations were, relative to any benefits;  
• the lessons that can be learned for managing implementation of any 
future amalgamations or major boundary changes;  
• the lessons that can be learned in terms of barriers and incentives for 
voluntary or ‘guided’ boundary changes; 
• prepare a report summarizing findings from each case study and an 
overall report for the ILGRP, taking into consideration its terms of 
reference’. 
 
The ILGRP also nominated the five merged local authorities to be assessed by Jeff Tate 
Consulting Pty Ltd. 
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Against this background, it should be noted that the 2004 NSW municipal merger 
program resulted in a fall in the number of local authorities from 174 to 152 entities. A 
thorough evaluation of the 22 merged entities would have compared their subsequent 
performance with unmerged councils falling in the same Australian Local Government 
Classification Categories employed by the NSW OLG using official NSW local government 
data to ensure a comparison of ‘like’ council with ‘like’ council. To gauge performance, a 
competent assessment would have used data drawn from the annual NSW Comparative 
Information on Local Government Councils (OLG, 2013), which contains comparative data 
by council across a range of indicators. In addition, a comprehensive analysis would also have 
assessed council performance against the TCorp (2013) financial ratios – some of which were 
later used as part of the Fit for the Future criteria - in order to determine whether the 2004 
amalgamation program had enhanced council performance.  
 
However, so loose were  the ILGRP’s terms of engagement surrounding the sample of 
councils, that Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd (2013: 2) was simply instructed to examine the 
following five councils: 
• ‘Clarence Valley Council (amalgamation);  
• Glen Innes Severn Council (amalgamation);  
• Palerang Council (amalgamation and associated boundary changes);  
• Greater Hume Shire (amalgamation and associated boundary changes); and  
• City of Albury (boundary changes associated with the Greater Hume Shire 
amalgamation)’. 
 
No explanation was advanced in Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd (2013) or in any of the 
ILGRP’s published documents to account for the basis on which these five local authorities 
were selected or how reflective they were of the total population of merged municipalities in 
NSW. Furthermore, the discursive ‘research technique’ employed by Jeff Tate Consulting Pty 
Ltd (2013: 22) was not only entirely qualitative, but also suffered from ‘selection bias’, as 
attested by the fact that the people ‘interviewed’ were drawn largely from the new post-




Over 50 people were interviewed either individually or in groups for the 
case studies of the five Councils selected by the Independent Review Panel. 
The Council representatives included Mayors, Deputy Mayors, Councillors, 
General Managers, Directors, middle managers and other staff who had 
either been through the amalgamation or boundary change process or who 
have been closely involved since in implementing the new structures and 
systems. 
 
Given the absence of rigour in its report, it is thus not at all surprising that Jeff Tate 
Consulting Pty Ltd (2013: 40) was only able to draw highly speculative conclusions which 
can hardly inform perceptive policymaking: 
The research and interviews both confirm that the costs associated with 
amalgamation are often underestimated. Poor planning and implementation 
processes combined with legal, industrial and Proclamation restrictions have 
increased costs, extended the negative impacts associated with 
amalgamations and hampered the achievement of positive 
outcomes…However, the 2004 amalgamations have achieved many positive 
outcomes despite the restrictions and poor planning and implementation. 
The positive outcomes include improvements in infrastructure and service 
delivery, the capacity to tackle larger and more complex projects and issues, 
greater ability to access external funding, the capacity to speak with a 
unified voice on behalf of local communities and improved opportunities for 
staff of Councils. 
 
In order to remedy the lack of rigour in Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd (2013), we now 
provide an empirical evaluation of the 2000-2004 council mergers in NSW using quantitative 
analysis. 
 
5. SELECTION OF SAMPLE OF 2004 MERGED AND UNMERGED COUNCILS 
 
The OLG has classified NSW councils into 11 groups termed ‘OLG Groupings’ (OLG, 
2009: 11). In general, the OLG groupings (Table 1) are based on broad demographic variables 
and arranged according to different population sizes in terms of ‘metropolitan’, ‘metropolitan 
fringe’, ‘regional’ and ‘rural’ contexts.  
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TABLE 1 COMES HERE 
Councils in OLG Group 4 comprised the sample employed in the empirical analysis in 
this paper. Table 2 lists the 24 councils chosen from Group 4. This group of councils 
undertakes generally similar functions and their performance against selected indicators can 
thus be compared on a ‘like-for-like’ basis. Group 4 councils all possess the following 
characteristics: Each of the 24 councils is centred in a discrete regional town or city; all are 
significant regional cities and towns in NSW; all are ‘general purpose’ councils providing the 
broad range of general council services to their communities; and all provide water and sewer 
services to their communities. These characteristics are not as common to the other ten 
groupings of NSW councils.  
TABLE 2 COMES HERE 
 
With respect to the sample, with a single exception, population ranges in the chosen 
councils fall between 19,000 and 62,000 persons. The exceptional council has a population of 
approximately 7,300 persons. Each of the councils in the sample derives its funding from 
similar activities and all have similar governance structures. Ten of the 24 councils have been 
merged since at least 2004, which implies that any comparative performance differences 
should be readily apparent by the 2012-2014 data collection period (i.e. a minimum eight year 
period since amalgamation). 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF 2000/2004 NSW AMALGAMATIONS 
 
Table 3 provides details of the ten general-purpose councils which were subject to 
amalgamation over the period from 2000 to 2004. Because most of the amalgamations 
involved the dismembering of constituent councils, this presents difficulties for empirical 
analysis. However, we can gauge the success of the merger program by examining and 
comparing the performance of the cohort of general-purpose amalgamated entities against (a) 
all councils in the jurisdiction and (b) a group of peers drawn from Group 4 of the NSW OLG 
classification system. 
TABLE 3 COMES HERE 
Table 4 compares the Financial Sustainability Rating (FSR) of the ten general-purpose 
NSW councils with the FSR for the entire NSW local government system. This comparison 
clearly demonstrates that the FSR assigned to the two cohorts by TCorp (2013) do not show 
any material difference in performance between the ten general-purpose councils which 
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experienced forced amalgamation and the remainder of NSW councils. In fact, the ten 
general-purpose councils under consideration had a higher proportion of sub-standard 
performance (i.e. ‘very weak’ and ‘weak’) than the rest of NSW councils. By way of contrast, 
the remaining NSW municipalities had a slightly higher proportion of councils exhibiting 
acceptable levels of performance (‘moderate’, ‘sound’, ‘strong’).  
TABLE 4 COMES HERE 
Given the claims made by proponents of municipal mergers it is somewhat surprising that 
the performance of the ten general-purpose councils amalgamated in earlier programs is 
slightly lower than the remainder of the jurisdiction. This data suggests that the 2000/04 
amalgamations program may not have been as successful as its architects had predicted. 
 
A more nuanced result is possible by comparing over the three year period the individual 
financial ratio indicators in the Fit for the Future assessments. Table 5 summarizes the ratios 
in Fit for the Future. 
TABLE 5 COMES HERE 
For this purpose, four of the Fit for the Future ratios are defined and employed in exactly 
the same way as prescribed by the OLG (2013): Operating Performance, Own Source 
Revenue, Building and Infrastructure Renewal, and Asset Maintenance ratios. 
 
However, we examined the Infrastructure Backlog ratio over three years instead of one 
owing to existing evidence of significant ‘gaming’ by councils of this data. The Debt service 
cover ratio has been dropped entirely owing to the logical flaws in the method adopted by the 
OLG (2013), centered on the fact that a council with no debt could improve its ranking by 
taking on an additional ‘token’ amount of debt. The Debt ratio was also radically altered in 
direct contradiction to the advice provided to the OLG by TCorp (2013) which the OLG had 
previously commissioned to measure financial sustainability. 
 
We have also altered the expenditure per capita ratio to reflect the functional unit most 
appropriate to municipal service provision (i.e. number of assessments). Finally, we have 
included a measure of staffing ratios which – in the absence of more sophisticated data 
envelopment analysis – is necessary for an elementary understanding of municipal efficiency 
(although we stress that this is an empirical compromise required by our efforts to conform to 
the OLG model). 
 
14 
Table 6 details the various ratios of the amalgamated cohort (set out in Table 4) and the 
fourteen councils which represent the peer group according to OLG classification. A cursory 
examination of the data suggests that there is very little difference in the performance of the 
amalgamated cohort with respect to the peer group (which is consistent with our examination 
of FSR detailed in Table 4). 
TABLE 6 COMES HERE 
 
However, a superior way of evaluating whether there is a real difference in performance 
between the two cohorts is to conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA). An ANOVA 
compares the spread of the various financial ratios of individual councils within cohorts 
(amalgamated and non-amalgamated peers) to the spread of the same financial ratio between 
cohorts and thus provides a robust statistical test to determine whether there are statistically 
important differences between the financial ratios of the two cohorts.  
 
The standard deviations in parentheses in Table 7 provide an indication of the average 
variation in each financial ratio of individual councils to the mean financial ratio within the 
particular cohort. Somewhat predictably Table 7 - which contains the ANOVA results - finds 
no statistically significant difference between the two cohorts for each and every one of the 
seven financial ratios1. It should be noted that ANOVA deals with the possibility of sampling 
error and other statistical noise. What this means is that there is absolutely no empirical basis 
for supposing that the performance of the amalgamated cohort is in any way superior to that 
of their peers. It is worth stressing that this is a highly ‘inconvenient’ result for proponents of 
amalgamation, based on sustainability criteria. 
TABLE 7 COMES HERE 
 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
As we have demonstrated in this paper had the ILGRP approached the question of the 
outcomes of the 2004 NSW mergers in a technically competent manner, instead of simply 
instructing Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd to use a biased and unrepresentative five council 
sample, then it would have discovered that the earlier 2000-04 council mergers did not 
                                                          
1 Removal of the ‘outlier’ from the amalgamated cohort results in no change to the various findings of no 
statistically significant difference between the cohorts. 
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produce local authorities exhibiting superior performance, as measured using Fit for the 
Future FSR.  
 
From a policy perspective, an empirically rigorous evaluation of the outcomes of the 
2000-2004 council mergers of the kind undertaken in this paper would surely have given both 
the ILGRP and the NSW Government pause for thought on the desirability of a further round 
of costly council amalgamation which offered no prospect of improved local government 
performance. ‘Fact-free’ public policy making of the kind currently underway in NSW is a 
recipe for disaster.  
 
From the perspective of empirical research on the impact of forced amalgamation on local 
government, our paper breaks new ground by employing the ‘natural experiment’ offered by 
the 2000/04 NSW municipal mergers by examining the performance of merged and unmerged 
councils using 2014 data. In those local government systems where widespread forced 
mergers have taken place, and where comparable data is available after reasonable time 
period, future research could replicate the approach taken in this paper. In addition, future 
work along these lines could decompose performance data into discrete categories, such as 
financial indicators, service provision indicators, and the like, and then compare amalgamated 
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Table 1: NSW Office of Local Government Groupings 
Council Profile Description Population OLG Group 
Metropolitan 
Capital City  Not Applicable 1 
Metropolitan Small Less than 70,000 2 
Metropolitan Large Greater than 70,000 3 
Regional Towns & 
Cities 
 
Regional Small Between 20,000 – 70,000 4 





Less than 70,000 6 
Metropolitan Fringe 
Large 
Greater than 70,000 7 
Rural 
 
Rural Small Less than 2,000 8 
Rural Medium Between 2,000 – 5,000 9 
Rural Large Between 5,000 – 10,000 10 
Rural Very Large Between 10,001 – 20,000 11 





Table 2: List of 24 Councils 
Council Name Population 
2013 (OLG) 





Albury City Council 49,655 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Armidale Dumaresq 
Council 
25,278 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Ballina Shire Council 41,006 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Bathurst Regional Council 40,253 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Bega Valley Shire Council 33,259 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Broken Hill City Council 19,103 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Byron Shire Council 30,960 Regional Town/City 4 No 
City of Lithgow Council 21,009 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Clarence Valley Council 51,346 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Deniliquin Council 7,327 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Dubbo City Council 40,595 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Eurobodalla Shire Council 37,048 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Goulburn Mulwaree 
Council 
28,721 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Griffith City Council 25,489 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Kempsey Shire Council 29,198 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Lismore City Council 44,485 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Mid-Western Regional 
Council 
23,493 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Orange City Council 40,108 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Queanbeyan City Council 40,209 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Richmond Valley Council 22,702 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Singleton Council 23,785 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Tamworth Regional Council 58,922 Regional Town/City 4 Yes 
Wagga Wagga City Council 61,746 Regional Town/City 4 No 
Wingecarribee Shire 
Council 








Table 3: NSW General-Purpose Councils Merged over 2000-2004 
Amalgamated Council Date Constituent Councils 
Albury 
 
26 May 2004 Albury and Hume (part) 
Armidale-Dumaresq 
 
21 February 2000 Armidale and Dumaresq 
Bathurst 
 
26 May 2004 Bathurst and Evans (part) 
Lithgow 
 
26 May 2004 Lithgow, Evans (part), Rylstone (part) 




11 February 2004 Goulburn, Mulwaree (part) 
Mid-Western Regional 26 May 2004 Merriwa (part), Mudgee, Rylstone (part) 
Queanbeyan 
 
11 February 2004 Queanbeyan, Yarrowlumla (part) 
Richmond Valley 
 
21 February 2000 Casino, Richmond River 
Tamworth 17 March 2004 Barraba (part), Manilla, Nundle (part), 
Parry (part), Tamworth 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Financial Sustainability Ratings 
TCorp (2013) Financial Sustainability 
Rating 



























Table 5: Definitions and Benchmarks of Fit for the Future Criteria 




Operating ratio  >0% (operating revenue † - operating expenses) / operating 
revenue †.  
Own Source 
Revenue ratio  
 




<2% estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory condition / 
total (Written Down Value) infrastructure assets.  
Debt Service Cover 
ratio 
Greater than 0 
but less than 
20% 
(interest expense and principal repayments) / total 
continuing operating revenue† 




>100% asset renewals (building and infrastructure) / 





>100% actual asset maintenance / required asset maintenance. 
‘Efficiency’ Negative linear 
trend 
real operating expenditure (deflated to 2009 terms) per 
capita 
† revenue excludes capital grants and contributions 


























 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 
Amalgamated       
Quartile 1 11.3% -10.0% -11.4% 69.6% 67.0% 60.7% 
Median -7.5% -5.3% -4.4% 74.6% 71.8% 65.4% 
Quartile 3 -6.4% -1.5% -3.0% 78.8% 74.9% 73.1% 
Non-
Amalgamated 
      
Quartile 1 11.1% -7.7% -14.8% 73.9% 67.7% 62.3% 
Median -7.3% -4.9% -1.4% 76.7% 69.2% 72.5% 





















 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 
Amalgamated       
Quartile 1 17.6 17.5 18.1 $4,287 $4,287 $4,327 
Median 19.75 19.9 19.85 $4,401 $4,584 $4,666 
Quartile 3 20.8 20.6 21 $4,581 $4,796 $4,812 
Non-
Amalgamated 
      
Quartile 1 17.2 17.7 16.6 $4,052 $4,289 $4,175 
Median 19.15 18.55 19 $4,296 $4,412 $4,390 



















 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 
Amalgamated       
Quartile 1 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.85 0.77 0.63 
Median 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.94 0.90 0.95 
Quartile 3 0.11 0.11 0.19 1.03 1.09 0.99 
Non-
Amalgamated 
      
Quartile 1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.68 0.74 0.71 
Median 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.85 0.88 0.80 
Quartile 3 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.95 1.00 1.00 
 
 Building & Infrastructure 
Renewal Ratio 
Building & Infrastructure 
Renewal Ratio 
Building & Infrastructure 
Renewal Ratio 
 2014 2013 2012 
Amalgamated    
Quartile 1 64.4% 42.5% 32.8% 
Median 73.0% 55.9% 51.8% 
Quartile 3 81.7% 91.3% 93.4% 
Non-
Amalgamated 
   
26 
Quartile 1 39.6% 33.4% 36.5% 
Median 57.5% 60.0% 62.8% 
Quartile 3 73.7% 106.8% 82.7% 
 
 
Table 7: ANOVA of 2014 Fit for the Future Indicators 







No statistically significant difference 




No statistically significant difference 






No statistically significant difference 




No statistically significant difference 






No statistically significant difference 




No statistically significant difference 




No statistically significant difference 
 
 
 
